THE WEAKENING OF THE CHECK AND BALANCES FUNCTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN BOLIVIA, IN LIGHT OF THE UNDERMINING OF THE INTERPELLATION AND CENSORSHIP MECHANISM BY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES

Abstract

This article provides a reflective analysis of the systematic weakening of the oversight and control function of the Legislative Branch in relation to other branches of power within the framework of the theory of checks and balances. It focuses on the institution of parliamentary interpellation and censure, identifying actions and resolutions issued by constituted powers over the past five years that have aimed to undermine this control mechanism. The result of this process is the inapplicability of censure and the inherent weakening of the Rechtsstaat in Bolivia.

Parliamentary interpellation is an institution that enables the Legislative Branch to exercise oversight over government activities. Its origins lie in the British parliamentary system, which was further strengthened in modernity by Montesquieus contributions to limiting the absolute power of rulers. It has also been adopted by presidential systems, albeit in a more attenuated form with variations according to each country. The Bolivian constituent assembly adopted this institution in response to the need for rigorous oversight between the branches of political power, a responsibility entrusted to the Legislative Branch in order to inspect and monitor the actions of the Executive Branch. This mechanism only applies to State Ministers and involves their summons to provide a report or answer questions regarding their conduct. Should a weighted majority of representatives of the sovereign express dissatisfaction, a motion of censure is issued, resulting in the removal of the official due to a loss of confidence to continue in office.

In Bolivia, this institution has been systematically undermined, rendering it ineffective and leading to a diminished real effectiveness of the Rechtsstaat.